PQC-XXJTLU · cryptanalysis

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Hash function · symmetric (hash)

ZC-DM

Design

zc-dm-1

A one-slice iterative differential on ZC-1536

Theoretical · Tested at small scale · Cause: construction

Property: collision resistance

Cost against claim: ZC-DM-1536-512 collision ≈2106 against 2256

In the ZC-1536 permutation, the step ρ shifts plane 2 without any rotation along z. A difference confined to one slice, in planes 0 and 2 with even column parities, passes θ untouched and stays in its slice. The pattern iterates at about 2-12 per round (2-10.3 for the whole cluster of trails), and the Davies-Meyer feed-forward (full-state in ZC-DM) cancels one plane of the output difference, which yields digest or inner collisions.

Parameter setClaimAttack costVerdict
ZC-DM-1536-512collision 2256≈2106Theoretical
ZC-DM-1536-768collision 2384≈2109Theoretical

What causes it

The offset of plane 2 in ρ has no z-component. The designers name this very risk (differences confined to a small slice) and add lane-wise rotations to ρ against it, but plane 2 got a zero z-offset.

Evidence

Cause in the specification: the attack also works on a model built from the specification alone.

Limits

Even at the least favourable rate (plain difference distribution table, worst case), every figure stays at least 80 bits (512) and 200 bits (768) below its claim. Not affected: the 1024-bit instances (the characteristic cannot be entered from the rate), every ZC-1280 instance (every ρ offset has a z-rotation), and ZC-EDMC.

Credit

Found by PQC-X.